

# Wisconsin FAD Response Plan

*(Version 12-10)*

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## **I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **Purpose:**

This plan defines the framework needed to detect, control, and eradicate a highly contagious foreign animal disease (FAD) in order to return Wisconsin agriculture to normal production, and the United States to disease free status, as efficiently as possible.

### **Situation:**

Wisconsin has extensive and varied dairy, livestock and poultry industries, with cash receipts totaling over \$5 billion annually. These industries are highly vulnerable to an outbreak of a foreign animal disease. During the past several years, foreign animal disease outbreaks have occurred in other states and countries resulting in devastating economic consequences. Control and eradication of these diseases consumes enormous amounts of resources and results in trade and national income loss.

### **Authorities and Response Coordination:**

In contrast to the initial emergency response to a fire, flood, or tornado, a foreign animal disease (FAD) response will require a rapid initial response from state agencies with special expertise. Statutory authority to conduct an FAD response is held by the Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection (DATCP) under Wis. Stat. 93.07(10). Further, veterinarians and laboratories are required to report suspicion of a foreign animal disease to DATCP. The technical veterinary expertise required to implement measures to control the disease will be provided by DATCP and the US Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service - Veterinary Services (USDA-VS).

The USDA Veterinary Services has responsibility, expertise and authority to address animal diseases that threaten U.S. agriculture. The USDA provides the bulk of the funding at the local, state and national level for response to disease outbreaks because they all have a national impact. This funding may be delivered directly from USDA to supporting agencies such as DATCP. Consequently, DATCP and USDA maintain a unique relationship of cooperation in safeguarding Wisconsin's livestock resources.

Upon discovery of a FAD in Wisconsin, DATCP and USDA/Vs will work with local officials to coordinate the response for the incident. To most efficiently coordinate the response, the state and federal animal health agencies will operate in Unified Command under the Incident Command System. DATCP and USDA-VS will also contact local officials and provide an Advance Team of 2-4 individuals to the affected county. The Advance Team will coordinate with local officials to gather and share information, assess the need for resources, and identify the roles of the county and local entities in managing the FAD response. In a large incident, the Unified Command may request that the State Emergency Operations Center be activated to provide support and coordinate resources as needed.

### **Initial Reporting and Investigation (1<sup>st</sup> Response):**

Any member of the agriculture or animal health community might first detect the abnormal situation indicating a possible FAD. Ideally, this detection will occur soon after the disease is introduced and

will be reported to DATCP or Wisconsin's APHIS/VS Area Office. Together, the State Veterinarian and the USDA/VS Area Veterinarian-in-Charge (AVIC) for Wisconsin will send a Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) to follow up on a report of a possible FAD. A Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician in Wisconsin is designated by the State Veterinarian and the AVIC, is a state or federally employed veterinarian, and is trained to recognize signs of a foreign animal disease, collect appropriate diagnostic samples, and take initial actions.

The FADD will make a field diagnosis and in consultation with the State Veterinarian and the AVIC and will determine the likelihood of an FAD. Samples will be collected from affected animals and submitted for testing to a federal laboratory.

### **Response Activities:**

When laboratory results, combined with compatible clinical signs and epidemiologic information, indicate a foreign animal disease is strongly suspected, the USDA-APHIS/VS and DATCP will initiate the response coordination. Response activities are intended to prevent the spread of the disease and determine the likely route of introduction while also eliminating the disease-causing agent using the following principles:

- 1) detect the disease quickly;
- 2) prevent contact between susceptible animals and the disease causing agent;
- 3) stop production of the disease-causing agent by infected animals; and
- 4) increase the disease resistance of susceptible animals.

The following activities are used to accomplish control and eradication:

- Stop animal movement (quarantine) to and from the affected premises
- Implement bio-security measures on the premises to ensure the disease organism will not be
  - a) moved off the farm through movement of vehicles or people or
  - b) spread to other susceptible groups of animals on the farm.
- Initiate an epidemiological investigation to:
  - Identify contacts (animals, people, vehicles) who have recently moved on or off the premises and quarantine additional premises associated by contact
  - Identify all properties in the appropriate area with susceptible animals and monitor these animals for signs of the disease
  - Determine the possible contact between wildlife and infected animals and implement a plan to detect and control the disease in wildlife.
- Establish a control zone and surveillance zone around infected premises which defines the activities to be conducted to detect and control the disease
  - Define permitted movement of products and non susceptible animals
  - Define affected "compartments" within the industry and which other compartments can continue to operate with additional control measures and assessment
- Consider all options for depopulation of the affected animals after determining the value of the herd or flock
  - Controlled slaughter
  - Humane euthanasia and disposal without spreading the disease
- Clean and disinfect affected premises
- Initiate the information management plan

- Prepare to receive vaccine and develop vaccination plan if vaccination becomes a viable control measure.

## **II. INTRODUCTION**

### **A. Purpose**

1. This plan defines the framework needed to detect, control and eradicate a highly contagious foreign animal disease (FAD) introduced into Wisconsin. The primary goal for the execution of this plan is to return farms to normal production and to allow Wisconsin and the rest of the United States to return to disease free status as efficiently as possible.
2. This plan also attempts to define the role of local, state, and the federal government in an FAD response in Wisconsin.

### **B. Scope**

1. This plan does not apply to those diseases proven to be zoonotic (diseases that affect both humans and animals – i.e. monkey pox, West Nile virus) as these diseases fall under the primary jurisdiction of the Wisconsin Department of Health Services with support from county health departments. For these instances, DATCP will be a supporting agency available to provide capabilities and resources for the responses when requested.
2. Similarly, this plan does not apply to animals that are abandoned or neglected or to those injured or killed by natural or technological disasters. Responses to these events are the responsibility of local government. DATCP can be a supporting agency for these responses when requested, and is available to provide technical and tactical resources.

## **III. AUTHORITIES**

### **A. Local**

Other than the responsibility to minimize the impact on its citizens from an FAD event, no authority to command or manage an FAD response exists at the local/county level. Counties are encouraged to develop and exercise an FAD response support plan to facilitate an efficient response.

### **B. State**

The Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection has the authority to quarantine or depopulate animals that are exposed to a contagious or infectious disease if it is necessary to protect the health of the domestic animals and humans of the state. The State Veterinarian similarly has the authority to direct the operational activities to control and eradicate an FAD, including depopulation, indemnification, and disinfection of premises. He/she may also prohibit the arrival in and departure from the state of infected or exposed animals. See Annex XX \_ for statutory authorities held by DATCP.

After receiving notification and a recommendation from DATCP, the Governor may declare an emergency for the purposes of allowing DATCP to establish emergency restrictions on the movement of people, livestock, machinery and other personal property as well as the ability to utilize the resources of the other state agencies including the Wisconsin National Guard.

C. Federal

The US Secretary of Agriculture has broad authorities and discretion for responding to and eliminating an animal disease. In connection with an emergency (not necessarily under a declaration of an Emergency) under which a disease of livestock threatens any segment of agricultural production in the United States, the Secretary may transfer funds, with the approval of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), from other agencies or corporations of the Department to the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) or other USDA agencies to reimburse certain Federal, State, and local response expenses, including operational costs, such as quarantine enforcement, perimeter control, depopulation, carcass disposal, and decontamination.

The Secretary may also declare an Extraordinary Emergency, which allows for the use of Federal authorities to take action within a State if the State is unable to take appropriate action to control and eradicate the disease. In many cases, states ask for an Extraordinary Emergency declaration because penalties for violating federal quarantines or other control measures may be stiffer and easier to prosecute than those of the state.

Numerous Federal agencies have authorities and responsibilities related to public, animal, and wildlife health, safety, and management. Many of these authorities include significant levels of discretion and may or may not be applied to an FAD response depending on the scope and magnitude of an outbreak. Support from these other Federal agencies may be requested by USDA, provided, and reimbursed under the provisions of the Economy Act

If there are needs that cannot be addressed under USDA or other Federal agency authorities, the President may elect to declare that a major disaster or emergency exists, in accordance with the provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act). This action can only take place after a declaration of emergency by the Governor of an affected State.

#### IV. POLICIES

A. Prevent Introduction and Early Detection of an FAD into the state.

DATCP's highest priority is to prevent the introduction of an FAD into the state. Wisconsin regulatory veterinarians (designated Foreign Animal Disease Diagnosticians by the State Veterinarian and the USDA Area Veterinarian in Charge) are trained to investigate and recognize foreign animal diseases in

domestic livestock. There is ongoing monitoring of Wisconsin livestock for foreign animal diseases via reporting of suspect animals to DATCP and subsequent investigation by FADDs. Should a foreign animal disease case be identified, DATCP in coordination with USDA APHIS, Wisconsin Emergency Management (WEM), and the County(s) where the case occurs, will launch a significant effort to eradicate the disease as expeditiously as possible through a variety of means with the overall goal to prevent the disease from spreading. See Annex XX \_\_ for Guidelines for Investigation and Initial Response to a Foreign Animal Disease. See Annex XX – Guidelines for county response to a Foreign Animal Disease

- B. Allow permitted movement of livestock and agricultural products when possible to provide business continuity.

Although disease control is the highest priority, every attempt possible should be made to allow the movement of animals and agricultural products for the livestock or poultry industries. This is incumbent on the rapid implementation of additional biosecurity measures across affected industries and operational and logistical support to ensure these actions are sufficient to limit the spread of the disease. Prior planning by industry to identify these critical control points and what it takes to guarantee their success is essential.

- C. DATCP, DNR and USDA Wildlife Services will evaluate the role of wildlife associated with an FAD and control as needed

An outbreak of a foreign animal disease may be first detected either in wildlife or domestic animals. Wildlife may be subject to aggressive and intensive surveillance to determine their role in the disease outbreak. If the disease is confirmed and wildlife species are suspected of spreading the disease, local, State, and national plans for depopulation or population reduction of the implicated species will be initiated.

- D. Limit the animals sacrificed and conduct depopulation in a humane manner  
All depopulation activities will be conducted in a manner that is as humane as possible while being expedient enough to stop the spread of the disease and limit the number of animals sacrificed. One of the most efficient ways to perform depopulation may be transporting animals to contracted slaughter facilities in the area. For this option, risk management measures will be instituted to limit the number of additional premises infected by transported animals and their conveyances.

- E. Use disposal methods that stop disease spread with the least impact to the environment

Disposal methods should be effective in stopping the spread of the disease while having a minimal practical impact on the environment. If salvage of meat or protein is attainable while taking adequate biosecurity measures, it is preferred over carcass destruction. Attaining these goals highlights the need for prior

planning between animal health and environmental agencies at the local, State, and national levels to identify suitable options for various sites and species.

## **V. SITUATION**

Wisconsin has an extensive and varied animal industry in the state and as such is highly vulnerable to an outbreak of a foreign animal disease. Cash receipts from Wisconsin's livestock, dairy and poultry industries total over \$5 billion annually. Wisconsin is primarily known for its dairy farms which produce 13% of the nation's milk and 26% of its cheese. We also have robust beef, pork and poultry industries within the state. Several serious foreign animal disease outbreaks have occurred in other states and countries resulting in devastating economic consequences. Control and eradication of these diseases consumes enormous amounts of resources and results in trade and national income loss.

## **VI. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS**

Some FADs may require only a limited response which will fall within the resource capabilities of DATCP, USDA APHIS (within WI), and the affected county. Other FAD outbreaks like Foot and Mouth Disease or Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza may totally overwhelm these agencies and their resources and will require the full resources of the emergency management system within the state. This will especially be true if Wisconsin is not the first state affected and Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) and National Response Framework (NRF) resources are in short supply nationally.

Although an FAD outbreak is not directed by local government because of their authority limitations for this type of an event, utilization of local public and private resources for the response will always be the most efficient option. Local governments are encouraged to plan for support for an FAD response to minimize its impact on their citizens as they would for any other potential hazard that threatens their community.

## **VII. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS**

### **A. Coordination and Control**

#### **1. Incident Command**

- a. For a small scale FAD event, Unified Command between DATCP and APHIS will be instituted. For an incident requiring a larger response, DATCP and the WI USDA APHIS Area Office will request an Incident Management Team from USDA-APHIS to manage the response organization on their behalf. (Delegation of Authority template is Annex XX) In either case, an incident command post (ICP) will be established as close to the affected county or counties as practical. See Annex XX \_\_\_ for the template of the WI ICS structure for an FAD

- b. Depending on the scope of the response, DATCP may request that the county EOC, and/or the state EOC, be activated to provide local coordination of resources and policy to support the ICP.
  - c. For a wide-spread FAD outbreak, multiple ICPs may be required across the state and Area Command established to provide direction to the incident commanders, prioritize resources among the incidents, and take supervisory burdens off of the agency administrators/executives. Similarly, multiple county EOCs will need to be activated to support the resource needs and coordination locally.
2. **Lead Agencies**

Because of its statutory authority, the Wisconsin Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection is the lead state agency for an FAD event and directs activities at the local and state level. Its corresponding federal agency is USDA APHIS Veterinary Services which not only has personnel permanently deployed throughout the state for day to day livestock and poultry disease program work but also serves as the funding stream for most FAD events.
3. **Supporting Agencies**

For small scale FAD events the participation of supporting agencies may be limited at both the state and federal level. For a larger scale event, many supporting agencies may be involved and county emergency management, Wisconsin Emergency Management , and FEMA may be requested to play coordinating roles for the non-technical functions of the response. For these large events, the state EOC may be activated and a joint field office (JFO) may be established. (See VIII. B. for specific roles)
4. **Public Information and Reporting**

DATCP will take the lead for public information and reporting at the local and state level. Because as few as one infected animal with an FAD in the state requires the US to report internationally its presence, all information dissemination will be coordinated with USDA. For a large scale FAD event, a Joint Information Center (JIC) will be established with each ICP and at the state and national level. Information management operations at each will correspond to their level within the incident response. JICs will include Public Information Officers (PIOs) from supporting agencies and industry. See Annex XX for the FAD Information Management Plan

## B. Initial Detection and Assessment

Veterinary practitioners in Wisconsin have a responsibility to report any event that might indicate an FAD. However, any member of the agriculture or animal health community might first detect the abnormal situation that indicates a possible FAD. Ideally, this detection will occur soon after the disease is introduced and will be reported to DATCP or the Wisconsin APHIS/VS Area office. Together, the State Veterinarian and the USDA/VS Area Veterinarian-in-Charge (AVIC) for Wisconsin will dispatch a field veterinarian who is trained as a Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) to investigate a report of a possible FAD. See Annex XX \_\_\_\_

for VS Memo 580.4 which outlines guidance by USDA VS for the investigation of a potential FAD.

The FADD, who may be a DATCP or USDA APHIS employee, will make a field diagnosis and in consultation with the State Veterinarian, and the AVIC will determine the likelihood of an FAD. Samples will be collected from affected animals and submitted for testing to a National Veterinary Services Laboratory and the Wisconsin Veterinary Diagnostic Laboratory with priority based on the field diagnosis and consultation. For all FAD investigations where an outbreak is possible based on the field diagnosis, the premises is quarantined pending laboratory results. If the field diagnosis is consistent with a known FAD, disease control such as enhanced biosecurity and review of farm records for animal movements on and off the premises may be initiated immediately. See Annex XX \_\_ for Guidelines for Investigation and Initial Response to a Foreign Animal Disease.

#### C. Notification, Activation, and Deployment

For a potential FAD event, notification is a delicate tightrope. Rapid response is the key to early control of disease spread but a leak of information about an investigation that becomes a non-event and makes its way to international trading partners may cost the US livestock industries millions of dollars in lost revenues while the false information is sorted out. Presumptive and confirmatory laboratory results may not be available for 1-3 days from the start of the investigation.

At this point in the response, local government may not yet have been informed of a potential event in their geographical jurisdiction. The State Veterinarian and the AVIC will determine when to send the Advance Team of 2-3 individuals to the county. The Advance Team will brief the county emergency manager on the current situation, and work with local officials to identify resource needs, coordinate information dissemination, and identify other roles and responsibilities. The Advance Team will also consult with local officials in establishing a site for the incident command post. When initial laboratory results are consistent with the field diagnosis and indicate the presence of an FAD, the ICP will be established and staffed by DATCP and APHIS employees from around the state and operational activities will begin.

#### D. Resource Allocation

Depending on the scope of the incident, the county EOC may be activated to support the ICP, and local resources may be requested to help determine the ICP location and to provide personnel and resources to fill out the response organization with tactical and support resources. The kinds of resources requested may range from agricultural outreach specialists to animal handlers to excavation equipment and operators to clerks. How and where resources are used

on the incident will be determined by the incident management team based on the incident objectives.

E. **Disease Control and Eradication Activities**

Measures to control and eradicate the disease will be based on the science of the individual disease including infectivity, incubation period, morbidity and mortality, detection and prevention methods. Measures include:

1. **Quarantine and Restricted Movement**

To effectively prevent the spread of the outbreak use of quarantine and movement controls will be implemented proportionate to the threat. For FMD and other highly-contagious and devastating diseases, not only will the infected and contact premises be placed under quarantine, disease management zones will be established around these premises with only specified activities allowed in each (See Annex XX USDA APHIS FMD PReP October 2008). In an attempt to reestablish Free Zones as quickly as possible to support the continuity of business in the rest of Wisconsin and the US, the infected county, counties, or even the whole state may have movement of susceptible animals and products stopped or restricted until the situation can be sorted out and areas can be proven to be free of the disease. For infected premises, animal, people and vehicle movement from affected premises will be restricted or controlled to prevent disease spread, (See quarantine forms.

2. **Containment**

Employ biosecurity measures to ensure the organism is not spread by movement when it is allowed. Stop production of the disease organism or increase resistance to the disease within the susceptible animal population by vaccinations or other methods, See Biosecurity guidelines and protocols

3. **Surveillance**

Monitor susceptible animals with previous contact or within geographic proximity to affected premises for early detection and response to disease spread, This includes wildlife species that may have contact with infected animals and potentially become infected with the disease. See protocols on surveillance guidelines

4. **Depopulation and Disposal**

Prompt depopulation and disposal of animals is critical to eliminate a source of the disease. Fair and prompt appraisal is required for the depopulation process to continue. For the diseases covered by this plan (none are significant threats to human health), disposal of carcasses and other debris generated by control measures from an FAD should be conducted using the local plan for debris generated by a natural or technological incident, in consultation with DNR. (See Carcass Disposal, a Decision Makers Guide). Because the scope of disposal operations may greatly exceed that of other events, mutual aid or state resources

may have to be requested early in the response to keep up with the workload. For an FAD, disposal operations will require enhanced biosecurity measures to prevent spread of the disease agent but effective cleaning and disinfection with the appropriate solution makes this risk almost nil. (See memo on appraisal and indemnity)

5. Cleaning and Disinfection

Effectively disinfect and decontaminate equipment and materials to eliminate disease organism. In most cases, the most difficult part of disinfection and decontamination of a premises or conveyance for an FAD agent is removal of infectious organic matter. Once the organic matter is cleaned away and disposed of in an appropriate manner, disinfection is simply a matter of using the appropriate disinfection process for that FAD agent. See list of appropriate disinfectants and protocols

6. Permitted Movement

During a foreign animal disease outbreak, movement of feed, animals, their products or by-products in a just-in-time delivery system, such as exists in US agriculture, could be significantly impacted by movement restrictions during a foreign animal disease outbreak. Movement restrictions are put in place based on the concern of disease spread via transportation. The response must include a plan for the permitted biosecure movement of these products to allow continuation of business activity.

## **VIII. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

A. Primary Agencies

1. DATCP

Conduct prevention and preparedness activities including planning, training and exercising to prevent the introduction of the disease, detect it early, and respond quickly and efficiently to minimize its impact on the state and its animal agricultural industries.

2. APHIS

Veterinary Services– As the federal agency responsible for FADs, and a full partner with DATCP within the state, conducts prevention and preparedness activities including planning, training and exercising to prevent the introduction of the disease, detect it early, and respond quickly and efficiently to minimize its impact on the state’s animal agricultural industries. For most FAD outbreaks, serves as the source of federal funding for operations and indemnity.

B. Support Agencies and Their Contracted Services

1. County Government

To minimize the impact on its citizens, plan, train, and exercise to support an FAD event; activate its EOC and provide resources in a response, and participate in the recovery process

2. State Agencies

Many state agencies have authorities and capabilities either within their agency or through their standing contracts that might apply to an FAD response such as for

emergency and incident management, wildlife control, environmental protection, health protection and law enforcement. Supporting state agencies will have their assistance requested consistent with their own authorities and the Wisconsin Emergency Operations Plan

3 Federal Agencies

Similarly, many federal agencies have authorities and capabilities either through their agency or their standing contracts that might apply to an FAD response such as for emergency and incident management, wildlife control, environmental protection, health protection and law enforcement. Supporting federal agencies will have their assistance requested consistent with their own authorities and the National Response Framework.

4 Wisconsin Agrosecurity Response Network.

Documents to consider as attachments:

- Appropriate excerpts from the USDA HPAI/FMD response plan
- Wildlife Plan
- Disposal Matrix
- WVDL NAHLN Summary
- Communications plan for FAD
- WI National Veterinary Stockpile Reception Plan
- Templates for
  1. permit for movement
  2. Quarantine form
  3. ICS structure
  4. Delegation of authority